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THE  HIGH unemployment  in 1975  and  the possibility  that  it will persist  for 
several  years  raise  in very  stark  terms  the issues  of the inflation-unemploy- 
ment tradeoff.  One aspect of this question,  which has been debated  ex- 
tensively  in the past decade, regards  the social costs of inflation and 
unemployment:  whether  macroeconomic  policymakers  should strive  for 
lower  inflation  rates  or lower unemployment  rates,  recognizing  that they 
cannot achieve  both at the same time and may not be able to achieve  a 
satisfactory  level  of either.  A neglected  aspect,  which  nevertheless  deserves 
attention,  regards  the "optimal"  time  path  of unemployment  in a recession 
-optimal, that  is, from  the  standpoint  of reducing  inflation  per  manhour  of 
unemployment  experienced  in the  recession.  Since  the one social  value  of a 
recession  is its ability  to stop inflation,  some  time  paths  for unemployment 
must  achieve  this objective  more  efficiently  than others.  This paper  exam- 
ines the timing  issue.' 
Note: This paper  purports  to answer  a question  raised  at the dinner  discussion  of the 
Brookings  panel  in December  1974.  I have benefited  from discussions  with Roger Craine 
and several  members  of the Brookings  panel. I also thank Douglas Battenberg  for simu- 
lating the SMP model. 
1. There  have  been  some  recent  debates  on this issue  in connection  with the politically 
ill-fated  "long-run  economic  projections"  in the budget  document  for fiscal  1976  (see The 
Budget  of the United  States Government,  Fiscal Year  1976, p. 41). These projections  had 
the unemployment  rate  remaining  in the vicinity  of 8 percent  through  the end of 1976  and 
still as high  as 6 percent  as late as 1979-inspiring questions  of whether  this much  unem- 
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To ask  how  unemployment  can  best  be timed  to minimize  inflation  means 
assuming  that macroeconomic  policymakers  can control the rate of un- 
employment,  at least over some horizon.  Such an assumption  is patently 
untrue  for periods  as short  as a quarter,  and  recent  events  have  taught  that 
it may  be a dubious  proposition  even  for one  year.  Yet, granting  that,  most 
economists  would  still  agree  that  as long  as the unemployment  rate  remains 
above  some  frictional  level-as  it clearly  would  in a recession-its short- 
run  course  can be influenced  by monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  And then  the 
questions  about timing that this paper addresses  do become relevant: 
Should  policymakers  let the  unemployment  rate  rise  sharply  and  then  try  to 
bring  it back  down  sharply  (a V-shaped  recession,  in current  parlance)?  Try 
to maintain  it at approximately  the same level for a period of time (a 
saucer-shaped  recession)?  Let it rise  sharply  and  bring  it back  down slowly 
(a skewed  V)?  Simply  ignore  timing?  Given  today's  problem-a recession 
during  which  the unemployment  rate  has already  risen  sharply-the analy- 
sis of the  paper  can  be altered  slightly  to ask how much  more  inflation  will 
be created  in a fast, as opposed  to a slow, recovery. 
The paper  has both a theoretical  and an empirical  component.  In the 
theoretical  section,  I assume  that policymakers  are resigned  to accepting 
some  average  level of unemployment  for the next  five years,  but that each 
year  they  alter  its rate  so as to minimize  rates  of inflation  over  an undeter- 
mined  time horizon.2  While they can control  year-to-year  changes  in the 
ployment  was necessary,  and whether  it was necessary  for such a long time. In a more 
technical  vein, back in 1949,  Thomas C. Schelling  discussed  whether  it was better  to get 
recessions  over  with quickly  or drag  them  out, but he was concerned  with the response  of 
private  spending  demands  to rates  of price  change;  see Schelling,  "The  Dynamics  of Price 
Flexibility,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 39 (September  1949), pp. 911-22. Later, 
Edmund  S. Phelps  used control theory  to compute  optimal rates of unemployment  and 
inflation  in a very  long-run  context, in "Phillips  Curves,  Expectations  of Inflation  and 
Optimal  Unemployment  over Time," Economica,  vol. 34 (August 1967), pp. 254-81. 
This type of analysis was extended  in various directions  and quantified  by Robert E. 
Hall, "The Phillips Curve and Macroeconomic  Policy," in Karl Brunner  and Allan 
Meltzer (eds.), The Phlillips  Curve  and Labor Markets (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
1975);  and by C. D. MacRae and E. C. MacRae, "Adaptive  Control of Inflation  and 
Unemployment,"  in NEREM Record,  vol. 12, Northeast Electronics  Research  and En- 
gineering  Meeting,  1970  (Boston  Section,  Institute  of Electrical  and Electronics  Engineers, 
1970)  (Urban  Institute  Reprint).  The paper  also bears  some similarity  to the literature  on 
the political  business  cycle. See, for example,  William  D. Nordhaus,  "The Political  Busi- 
ness Cycle,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  vol. 42 (April 1975), pp. 169-90. 
2. As it turns  out, the analysis  reaches  identical  conclusions  if it is reversed-that is, 
if unemployment  is minimized  for a given five-year  level of inflation.  The problem  can Edward  M. Gramlich  169 
unemployment  rate,  policymakers  cannot  alter  the short-  or long-run  rela- 
tionship  between  unemployment  and  inflation,  and  they  must  try  to achieve 
macro  goals  within  this constraint.  The  paper  shows  how the optimal  path 
of unemployment  in these  five  years  varies  with  a series  of real-world  com- 
plications-nonlinearities  in the short-run  tradeoff,  adaptive  expectations 
of inflation,  and  varying  time  horizons  for fighting  inflation.  The empirical 
section  then  elaborates  on these  results  by computing  optimal  unemploy- 
ment  paths  for the next five  years  given  by one commonly  used empirical 
model of the price-wage  process-that  of the SMP (SSRC-MIT-Penn) 
econometric  model-and, with the same  model,  estimating  how much  in- 
flation  can be reduced  over  the five  years  if the optimal  path  is taken. 
Minimizing  Rates  of Inflation  for Five  Years 
The problem  of finding  the optimal path for unemployment  involves 
balancing  two influences  acting  in opposite  directions.  On the one hand, 
the underlying  nonlinearity  in the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff,  which 
makes  high  unemployment  rates  relatively  less  effective  in fighting  inflation, 
encourages  policymakers  to spread  unemployment  evenly  across  the five 
years.  With  a given  "dose"  of unemployment  to administer  over  a five-year 
period,  they  prefer  not to give  more  than  one-fifth  in any one year  because, 
at the  margin,  extra  unemployment  would  be less effective  in fighting  infla- 
tion  in that  year.  On the other  hand,  the influence  of past  price  changes  on 
current  inflation  pushes  them  toward  killing  inflation  promptly  by taking 
more  unemployment  now than later, because  any inflation  that is killed 
now  means  that  much  less fuel for inflation  in future  years.  The optimiza- 
tion  exercise  works  out the  appropriate  compromise  between  these  two  con- 
flicting  forces. 
Assume  first  that the nation  has a President  who wants  to minimize  the 
sum  of the inflation  rates  in each of the next five  years,  but does not care 
what  happens  after  that time. His implicit  loss function  is 
(1)  5L  -  ,p? 
be set up either  way, but the one I have chosen is more in keeping with the spirit of 
empirical  work in the Phillips curve, which makes unemployment  the independent 
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where  L represents  the  expression  to be minimized  and  P is some  aggregate 
price  level. This would be almost  the same as minimizing  the growth  in 
prices  over  the next  five years,  (P5-  Po)/Po,  the sole difference  being that 
the annualized  target  scales  down  absolute  changes  in the later  years  since 
price  levels  are  higher  by that  time.  This  loss function  could  be elaborated 
to allow  for the effects  of initial  conditions,  nonlinear  penalties  for high or 
unexpected  rates of inflation,  or the scaling  down of later price changes 
through  a time-preference  discount  rate,  but this President  does not worry 
about such complications.  For now, I assume  that a given reduction  in 
inflation  is as desirable  to him in 1979  as in 1975. 
The inflation-unemployment  relationship  used here is a standard  non- 
linear  tradeoff,  modified  to take  account  of criticisms  raised  against  simple 
tradeoff  functions  because  they  ignore  the following  elements: 
1. There  is an undetermined  parameter  that  establishes  the nonlinearity, 
or the relative  impact  of high and low unemployment  rates  in reducing  in- 
flation. 
2. The  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  unemployment  can also be shifted 
in the short  run,  and possibly  eliminated  in the long run,  through  a set of 
lagged  price-change  terms.  These  could  represent  adaptive  expectations  of 
inflation,  cost-of-living  provisions,  difficulties  in changing  contract  terms, 
or any other  channel  through  which current  inflation  affects  future  price 
changes. 
3. Other  influences,  such as changes  in exchange  rates,  world  prices,  or 
prices  of raw materials,  can also alter the inflation-unemployment  rela- 
tionship. 
The specific  equation  determining  the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff 
is 
(2)  =-a  +a  U-m+  a  +P-'  e, 
P-1 
0 
i1  -j+  -1- 
where  U is the rate of unemployment,  all a, >  0, and the residual  e mea- 
sures  all outside  forces that affect inflation  independently  of unemploy- 
ment.  The  long-run  tradeoff  vanishes  if 
n 
a,1, 
The  nonlinearity  parameter,  m, determines  the relative  short-run  impact  of 
low and  high  unemployment  rates  in fighting  inflation:  increases  in the un- Edward  M. Gramlich  171 
employment  rate around  4 percent  are always  2"n+1  times as effective  in 
fighting  inflation  as are  increases  in the unemployment  rate  around  8 per- 
cent.3 
The optimal  unemployment  path  for the President  concerned  only with 
minimizing  rates  of inflation  for the next five years  can be computed  by 
minimizing 
(3)  +  \  (  -5U) 
where  X is the Lagrange  multiplier  and U is the five-year  average  rate of 
unemployment.  Substituting  (2) into (3), finding  the minimum  point with 
respect  to each Ui, and solving  the system  for relative  unemployment  rates 
yields 
(4) 
U4/U5=  1+a2 
U31U5=  n+l  +  a2  +  a2 +  a3 
U2, 
/u5  =  Al+  a2  +  a2  +  a3  +  a  3  +  2a2a3  +  a4 
U1/U5=  m+5/l+a2+a2+a3+a2+2a2a3+a+a42+3a2a3+2a2a4+a3+a. 
Notice  first  that  the allocation  of unemployment  over  time  is independent 
of the average  level, U. Policymakers  use unemployment  to root out infla- 
tion,  and  they  will  proceed  with  the same  time  allocation  of unemployment 
for any total dosage.  This is true as long as the loss function  is not non- 
linear  in either  the level of inflation  or unemployment  (a condition  that 
would  not hold in a more  complex  analysis). 
3. This proposition  can be demonstrated  as follows: The short-run  absolute impact 
of changes  in unemployment  in reducing  inflation  in (2) is 
(2a)  O(AP/P-1)  -maiLh(m+l).  a  U 
With UL  and UH  denoting  low and high unemployment  rates, respectively,  the relative 
impact  is given  by 
(2b)  O(AP/P_1)/OUH  (  UHLJ+l 
The relative  impact depends only on the ratio between UH and UL and on the non- 
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If all  coefficients  of lagged  price  changes  (a2,  a3, ...  , an+) are set at zero, 
so that the short-run  tradeoff  is totally  independent  of previous  inflation, 
the solution to each of the relative  unemployment  relationships  equals 
unity.  Policymakers,  as expected,  would  minimize  inflation  by continually 
reallocating  unemployment  from years when its effectiveness  in killing 
inflation  is low (that is, those in which  its level is high) to years  when  its 
effectiveness  is high  (when  the  level  is low) until  all five  unemployment  rates 
are  equal.  But  if the  lagged  coefficients  of price  changes  are  not zero,  so that 
the short-run  tradeoff  is affected  by past rates  of inflation,  an early  attack 
on inflation  with  high unemployment  becomes  more  important.  The solu- 
tion in this  case  indicates  that  unemployment  should  be greatest  in the first 
year,  and diminish  with  each successive  year.  This pattern  traces  a skewed 
V, or a recession  in which  the unemployment  rate first  rises sharply  and 
then falls gradually.4  This result obtains  even in the absence  of specific 
penalties  for rapid  reductions  in unemployment  rates,  or "speed  limits"  as 
they are now termed.  The effective  speed  limit on this upswing  is the fact 
that each  successive  year's  unemployment  rate  is increasingly  less useful  in 
killing  inflation. 
The depth of the V depends  positively  on both the sum of the price- 
change  coefficients  and  the average  length  of the lag, but negatively  on the 
curvature  of the Phillips  curve  as measured  by m-because m lowers  the 
relative  ability  of high unemployment  to fight inflation  and hence raises 
the penalty  for deviating  from  a constant  path  for the unemployment  rate. 
The coefficient  for the unemployment  rate,  a,, does not alter  this penalty 
or the optimal  solution  because,  as was shown above,  it does not change 
these relative  impacts. 
These  results  can  be clarified  by the numerical  examples  given  in table 1. 
The first  column  shows  the "basic"  case,  in which  all coefficients  are  taken 
from an annualized  version  of the price-wage  sector of the SMP econo- 
metric  model.5  This  model  is accelerationist,  with  expectations  coefficients 
4. Although it is not worked  out rigorously,  the same  logic applies  to the extraneous 
inflation  residual,  e. Say that  the controlled  price  of "old"  oil (production  not in excess  of 
that produced  by a well in 1972)  has to rise sometime  between  now and 1980, and that 
when  it rises,  it will cause  general  inflation.  Because  of the lagged  price-change  coefficients 
in the Phillips curve, from a macro standpoint  alone this increase  in prices should be 
postponed  as long as possible.  In the real world, of course, these macro considerations 
would be balanced  against  others,  such as the short- and long-run  response  of demand 
and supply of petroleum  to actual and expected  price  changes. 
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Table 1. The Allocation of Unemployment  under  Varying 
Assumptions  about the Empirical  Relationship  between  Inflation and 




eration of  No  accel- 
Basic  inflationz  erationz  of  Sharper  Flatter 
Ratio  case  (a2  =  1;  iniflation  Phillips  Phillips  Adminis- 
or  (SMP  as =  0  (as =  0  curve  curve  tration 
year  model)  for]  ?  3)  for]  >  4)  (m =  2)  (m =  0.01)  projection 
Ratio between unemploymenit  rates (UI/U5) 
U1/U5  1.50  2.23  1.33  1.31  2.27  1.30 
U2/U5  1.37  2.00  1.28  1.24  1.88  1.27 
U3/U5  1.23  1.73  1.23  1.15  1.53  1.21 
U4/U5  1.10  1.42  1.10  1.07  1.22  1.11 
Unemployment rate, U, assuming five-year average is 7.3 percent 
1975  (U1)  8.86  9.73  8.20  8.31  10.53  8.1 
1976  (U2)  8.09  8.74  7.88  7.87  8.72  7.9 
1977  (U3)  7.26  7.55  7.58  7.30  7.10  7.5 
1978  (U4)  6.49  6.20  6.78  6.78  5.66  6.9 
1979 (U5)  5.90  4.37  6.16  6.34  4.64  6.2 
Sources: For the assumptions, the general  form of the equation is 
AP  6  AP-i 
p-  =  ao +  al Um  +  E  i_l_  +  e. 
where  P  is  the  general  price  level,  U  is  the  rate  of  unemployment,  and  nm  is  a  parameter  establishing  the 
relative impact of high and low unemployment rates. Unless otherwise stated, the following coefficients 
from the SMP model are used: m  =  1, a2  = 0.22, a3  =  0.26, a4  =  0.23, as  =  0.17, a(  =  0.09, a7  0.03. 
The administration  projection is from The Budget of the United  States Governmnent,  Fiscal Year  1976, p. 41. 
The ratios are calculated from data before rounding. 
a2 through a7 summing to unity. Like most econometric relationships, it 
assumes that m -  1. The optimal path for unemployment, under the as- 
sumption that the five-year average of the unemployment rate is the same 
7.3 percent  as in the administration's  long-run projection, involves a rate of 
8.9 in 1975, 8.1 in 1976, and so on down to 5.9 in 1979. The 1975 rate is then 
3 points above the 1979 rate. The pattern of unemployment has a more 
definite V shape than the path contained in the long-run projection pro- 
Shocks,"  BPEA  (1:1974), pp. 19-29. The model was annualized  by computing  the quar- 
terly  reduced-form  response  of prices  to all independent  variables,  and  then  taking  annual 
averages  of these  responses. 174  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1975 
vided  by the administration  at the first  of the year,  which  is shown  in the 
last column  of the table.6  These  numbers  imply  an average  annual  rate of 
growth  of real  GNP of about  6.5 percent  over  the 1975-79  period,  high  by 
historical  standards  but still consistent  with  the speed  limit  implicit  in this 
model. 
The other  cases shown  in table 1 vary the parameters  of the inflation- 
unemployment  relationship  in ways  discussed  above.  If the acceleration  of 
inflation  took place  more quickly-say, with a2 =  1 and all other lagged 
price-change  coefficients  equal  to zero-an  immediate  and sharp  recession 
would  have  much  more  value:  the optimal  unemployment  rate  for the first 
year  becomes  9.7 percent.  If there  were  no acceleration  of inflation-say, 
with  all price-change  coefficients  but the first  two set equal  to zero, an im- 
mediate  recession  would  have  less value  and  the first  year's  unemployment 
rate  is 8.2.  Apart  from  this  difference,  however,  the optimal  paths  with  and 
without  acceleration  are quite  similar,  indicating  that the mean of the lag 
distribution  influences  the results  much  more  than  the sum  of the  lag coeffi- 
cients.  A pattern  similar  to that with no acceleration  emerges  when the 
SMP  expectations  coefficients  are restored  but with  more  curvature  in the 
Phillips  curve  (m =  2): again  unemployment  should be more evenly  dis- 
tributed  than  in the basic  case.  For what  it is worth,  both of these  paths  are 
very  close to those projected  in the budget  document.  On the other  hand, 
the  V becomes  very  sharp,  even  more  so than  in the case of quick  accelera- 
tion,  if the  curvature  in the Phillips  curve  is reduced  by setting  m very  close 
to zero  (see the last assumption  in table 1).7 
6. After the 1976 budget document was released, the unemployment  rate rose so 
rapidly  that the standard  forecast now puts the unemployment  rate for 1975 at about 
8.8 percent.  If administration  policymakers  were trying  to hold the five-year  average  at 
7.3 percent,  they would now implicitly  be following a path much closer to the optimal 
one of table 1. If the five-year  average  rate of unemployment  is raised  by 0.7 (8.8 -  8.1), 
the profile  of the recession  remains  suboptimal  in this sense. 
7. It is impossible  to set m exactly  equal  to zero because  then unemployment  ceases to 
have  an  effect  on inflation  and  the  whole  analysis  breaks  down.  However,  as m approaches 
zero, the relative  impact of high and low unemployment  rates in fighting  inflation ap- 
proaches  (UH/UL), the same  value  as when  the rate of inflation  depends  on the logarithm 
of unemployment.  This can be seen when (2) is rewritten  as 
(2c)  AP  _  -  c ln U + .... 
The absolute  impact  of changes  in unemployment  in reducing  inflation  is then 
(2d)  a(AP/P)  -  (A(XP/P)>(  ln U)--cU1  au  a InU  aOu/ Edward  M. Gramlich  175 
Minimizing  Rates  of Inflation  for Five  Years  and  Beyond 
Now assume  that this President  resigns  and is succeeded  by one who, 
while  he has nothing  against  minimizing  inflation  for the next five years, 
does not want  to burden  his successor  with an inflation-prone  economy 
either.  He correctly  perceives  that the strategy  followed  by his own prede- 
cessor  ignores  a very  important  point:  that  restricting  the minimization  to a 
five-year  period  does not penalize  actions  that may lead to inflation-per- 
haps  accelerating  inflation-beyond  that  horizon.  The same  reasoning  sug- 
gests  that  those  paths  of table 1 that  leave  the economy  in noninflationary 
equilibrium  in year  5 are  suboptimal,  because  they  imply  excessive  amounts 
of unemployment  in the first  five  years.  If the economy  will end  up at some 
noninflationary  rate  of unemployment  ultimately,  it is not as important  to 
generate  high  unemployment  immediately. 
The  loss  function  for  the  new  President  includes,  with  some  utility  weight, 
rates  of inflation  outside  of the five  years  he will be in office.  The President 
makes  unemployment-rate  policy  for only five years,  but he tries  to make 
it in such  a way that he bequeathes  a less inflation-prone  economy  to his 
successor,  and hence one that can enjoy lower unemployment  rates and 
higher consumption  levels. In  this sense the inflation-unemployment 
choices of this President  are analogous  to the consumption-investment 
choices  he also makes  during  his regime. 
The optimal  unemployment  path  for this more  farsighted  President  can 
be computed  by minimizing 
(5)  bi  p P  +  - 5U), 
where  b, is the utility  weight  the President  attaches  to reducing  inflation  in 
any future  year.  For the former,  more  myopic,  President,  the first  five bi 
were  one  (equation  3) and all others  were  zero.  If that  President  had had a 
longer  horizon,  more  bi would  equal  one and  fewer  would  equal  zero.  If he 
had an infinite  horizon  but an implicit  time-preference  discount  rate of r, 
and  the  relative  impact  reduces  to (UH/UL). The  logarithmic  form  approximates  that  used 
by Robert E. Hall, "The Process of Inflation  in the Labor Market,"  BPEA (2:1974), 
p. 366,  and  derived  by Charles  C. Holt and  others,  The  Unemployment-inflation  Dilemma: 
A Manpower  Solution  (Urban Institute,  1971), p. 100. 176  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
each  b, would  equal 
If he had an infinite  horizon  with  no time preference  at all, each bi would 
equal  unity.8 
The  optimal  allocation  of unemployment  for this new President  is deter- 
mined  just as before.  The analytical  solution  becomes  very  lengthy  and is 
not given  here,  but an approximate  numerical  solution  for the SMP  model 
is 
(6)  U4/U5 
=  J(b4+0.22b5+0.3 1b6+0.36  b)  5(b6+0.22b6+0.3  1b7+0.36 = b ) 
U3/ U5 
=  |(b3+0.22b4+0.3 lb5+0.36 E  b )  (b5+o.22b6+0.3 lb7+0.36  b,) 
U21  U,5 
=  (b2+0.22b3+0.31b4+O.36 E  b)  5(b6+0.22b6+0.3  1b7+0.36E  bX) 
Ul/  U5 
0(b+o.22b2+0.3  lb3+0.36  b  (b5+o.22b6+o.3 lb7+0  36  -b  i4 bi)-8~) 
8. Discounting  of future  inflation  can also be thought of as a way of dealing  with the 
complication  that arises  because  inflation  has both anticipated  and unanticipated  com- 
ponents.  Assume that inflation is harmful  only if it is unanticipated,  and that policy- 
makers  want to minimize  it only because  it is proceeding  at rates above the anticipated 
(optimal)  level. If r measured  the degree  to which anticipations  adjusted  upward  in re- 
sponse to a gap between  actual and anticipated  inflation  rates, this gap would then be 
lessened,  and inflation  would become less harmful,  at the rate of r percent  per year. In 
this sense,  it does not matter  whether  r reflects  the gradual  adjustment  of anticipated  to 
actual  inflation  or the time-preference  discounting  of future  inflation. 
In a similar  vein, future  rates of unemployment  could also be discounted.  On the one 
hand,  unemployment  now is more  damaging  than unemployment  later  because  of the lost 
productivity  of the missed investment; on the other hand, it is more damaging  later, 
when  more  people  will be unemployed  and more absolute  damage  will have occurred.  If, 
as seems  likely,  the rate  of return  on capital  is above the rate of growth  of the labor force 
corrected  for labor-augmenting  technology, the net effect of these forces would be to 
make present  unemployment  more damaging  and to smooth out to some degree  the V 
along the optimal  path (thus working  in the same direction  as the discounting  of future 
inflation).  In this model the importance  of unemployment  discounting will never be 
great,  however,  because  I assume  that the President  is making  unemployment  policy, and 
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Table 2.  The Allocation of Unemployment  under  Varying 
Assumptions  about the Time Horizon for Reducing  Inflation 
Ratios between  unemployment  rates  (UI/U5) 
Zero rate of time preference  Infinite horizon, time preference 
for n years  rate of r 
Ratio  n =  5  n  =  10  n  =  oo  r =  0.20  r =  0.10  r=0.05 
Us/Us  1.50  1.24  1.00  1.44  1.20  1.11 
U2/U5  1.37  1.18  1.00  1.31  1.15  1.08 
U3/U5  1.23  1.13  1.00  1.21  1.10  1.05 
U4/U.5  1.10  1.06  1.00  1.10  1.05  1.02 
Source: Equation (6) discussed  in the text; Ui, . . .,  U5 =  the unemployment rates in 1975 through 1979. 
The corresponding optimal paths are given in table 2. The table shows 
first how  the V-shaped recession is  spread out  as  the  time  horizon  is 
lengthened for a President with no implicit time-preference  rate, or as the 
implicit rate of time preference is reduced for a President with an infinite 
horizon. For either case, only a modest degree of farsightedness brings 
about a sizable reduction in the amplitude of the V-shaped recession. Table 
2 does not give absolute levels of the unemployment rate because presum- 
ably the dose of unemployment administered to kill inflation would also 
depend on the President's  time horizon. If, for example, the President had 
no time preference  at all and an infinite horizon, the nation need experience 
only slightly more unemployment than the natural rate in the first five 
years. 
How Much Can Inflation  (Unemployment)  Be Reduced? 
The previous sections have described the optimal path of unemployment 
in a recession  and have shown how it would vary with empirical  magnitudes 
and with the time preference  of the President  with regard  to killing inflation. 
But they have not addressed the issue of how important it might be to 
follow the optimal path for the unemployment rate. The question is how 
much more will inflation be reduced in the strategy  laid out in the basic case 
of table 1-the  optimal strategy for a nearsighted President who believes 
the SMP model-as  contrasted with a strategy that simply keeps the un- 
employment rate in each year equal to the five-year average-the  optimal 
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Table 3.  Yearly Unemployment  Rates and Average Annual Rates 
of Inflation  for Various Unemployment  Strategies, 1975-79 
Percent 
Average  unemployment  rate 
Year  or strategy  5%  6%  7%  8% 
Unemployment  rate, U, along the optimal  path 
1975  (U1)  6.05  7.26  8.48  9.68 
1976  (U2)  5.52  6.63  7.74  8.84 
1977 (U3)  4.96  5.95  6.95  7.93 
1978 (U4)  4.43  5.32  6.22  7.10 
1979  (Us)  4.03  4.84  5.65  6.45 
Five-year  average  annual  rate of increase  of 
private  nonfarm  price deflatora 
Us  follow optimal  path  6.48  5.52  4.82  4.24 
All U;equal  6.62  5.62  4.94  4.36 
Reduction  in inflation  along optimal  path 
0.14  0.10  0.12  0.12 
Source: Simulation of the price-wage  sector of the SMP model, as discussed in the text. 
a. Inflation rates are computed from fourth quarter of 1974 to fourth quarter of 1975, and so forth for 
five years. 
the price-change  coefficients  in the Phillips  curve  as long as he knows  the 
relationship  is nonlinear. 
These  comparisons  are  made  by simulating  the price-wage  sector  of the 
SMP  model  for the next five  years,  holding  unemployment  at its specified 
value  and the few other  exogenous  impact  variables  in it (unfilled  orders, 
prices  of raw  materials,  and  so on) at plausible  values.  Table  3 gives  specific 
values  of the unemployment  rate  for each five-year  average  rate,  using  the 
optimal  allocation  described  in the basic  case of table 1. The  bottom  panel 
gives  the average  annual  inflation  rate  of the private  nonfarm  deflator  over 
the five-year  period  along this optimal  path, and then compares  this rate 
with  one that would obtain  if all Ui are  held at the five-year  average.9 
Granted  that all empirical  price-wage  relationships  should be treated 
with  skepticism  these  days,  the table  does  contain  some  suggestive  findings. 
First,  because  of the continuing  force  of already  experienced  inflation,  even 
9. In order  to exclude from this comparison  the large amount of inflation that oc- 
curred  in the fourth  quarter  of 1974,  I have shown average  rates of inflation  from fourth 
quarter  to fourth quarter,  beginning  in 1974 and extending  for five years. I have also 
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this accelerationist Phillips curve predicts that inflation will be checked 
relatively little by higher unemployment rates: if unemployment averages 
6 percent or more for the next five years-which  it almost certainly will, 
given the high unemployment  rates now in prospect for 1975 and 1976-an 
increase in this average  unemployment  rate of 1 percentage point will lower 
the average  inflation rate by only about 0.6 percentage point. The improve- 
ments from following the optimal strategy are, in an absolute sense, very 
slight, amounting to only 0.12 percentage point across the four cases. But 
these improvements  are slight partly because inflation is already so insensi- 
tive to unemployment  in these ranges: if five-year  changes in the unemploy- 
ment rate offer only small amelioration of inflation, one-year changes could 
hardly  be expected to do better. It may be more meaningful to compare the 
reduction  in inflation  from following the optimal path (0.12) with that from 
letting the unemployment  rate rise by 1 percentage point (0.6). In this sense, 
following the optimal path allows the unemployment rate to be lower by an 
average  of 0.2 percentage  point over the next five years, or by 0.1 percentage 
point as contrasted with the projection in the budget document. Using the 
standard  Okun's law conversion, a reduction of 0.2 percentage point in the 
unemployment rate equals a 0.6 percent increase in GNP-$10  billion at 
today's prices-in  each of the five years. 
These results can be viewed in a different way, more relevant to current 
problems. The unemployment rate for 1975, the first year of this exercise, 
now is likely to be very close to the 8.86 percent average computed for the 
optimal path with the administration's  five-year  total amount of unemploy- 
ment. If this high unemployment in the first year does its job of killing in- 
flation, it permits a reduction in the average rate of unemployment for the 
next four years of approximately 0.3 percentage point-or  $15 billion in 
GNP per year-to  achieve the same average rate of inflation that is implied 
by the administration's  unemployment projection. Having taken a stiff dose 
of its anti-inflationary  medicine already, the economy needs less of it alto- 
gether. 
Conclusion 
The theoretical  message here is that if the economy needs periodic unem- 
ployment  to kill inflation,  it is usually  better  to submit  to a heavier  burden 
early  and  allow  the recovery  to proceed  in a more  noninflationary  environ- 180  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
ment later on. The precise pattern  for unemployment will then depend both 
on the empirical relationship between inflation and unemployment-par- 
ticularly on the way in which this relationship has shifted with past in- 
flation-and  on the haste with which policymakers feel they must kill in- 
flation. The empirical message is that, since variations in unemployment in 
the neighborhood of its present high level do not make much difference  for 
inflation, neither does the timing of unemployment. Although the amounts 
involved between optimal and suboptimal paths are thus not of earthshak- 
ing importance, this exercise indicates that now that the economy has al- 
ready taken so much unemployment, it can take at least a fairly strong 
recovery. 
Discussion 
SEVERAL  comments dealt  with the  specification of  Gramlich's model. 
Stephen Goldfeld called attention to its ignoring of uncertainty. He noted 
that, in fact, policy was likely to be influenced by uncertainty about the 
error term of the equation, about the size of the effects of past inflation 
and unemployment on current inflation, and about the link between the 
fiscal-monetary policy  instruments and  the  unemployment rate.  James 
Pierce added that the uncertainty about the relationship among current 
inflation, unemployment, and past inflation was clearly a major factor in 
policy planning these days. A model that uses point estimates of these re- 
lations in a certainty-equivalence framework may not provide much in- 
sight into the real problem. Saul Hymans and Franco Modigliani were 
concerned that the initial level of unemployment has no impact either on 
the average unemployment to be aimed for over the decision period or on 
the allocation of the average unemployment over time. They would have 
preferred  a model in which both these dimensions of the optimal time path 
depended on initial conditions. In relation to this point, Charles Holt ob- 
jected that the linear criterion function Gramlich used was unrealistic. A 
nonlinear  function would be more appropriate  since the concern of policy- 
makers appears to increase proportionately more than does the inflation or 
the unemployment rate. 
R. J. Gordon interpreted Gramlich's results as saying that alternative Edward  M. Gramlich  181 
time paths for unemployment offer little choice, given a slope of the short- 
run Phillips curve as flat as that in the SMP model. He also judged that 
inflation was currently slowing more quickly than that model would pre- 
dict. It was too early to tell whether this inaccuracy meant that inflation 
was responding faster to recession than the normal wage and price equa- 
tions would predict or that the model forecast failed to  recognize how 
much of last year's price increase was a one-shot affair that would abate 
automatically. Holt disagreed that there was little to  choose  among the 
alternative  paths presented by Gramlich. He felt that a $10 billion annual 
gain in GNP from following the optimal unemployment path should be 
significant in influencing policy and added that the gain from optimality 
would appear even larger if a nonlinear criterion function were used. Holt 
was concerned by the paper's evidence that aggregate-demand  approaches 
to fighting  inflation are very costly in terms of the unemployment necessary 
to achieve a slowdown. He suggested that economists should be examining 
new alternatives to  traditional aggregate-demand instruments. And  he 
proposed that ways to wind down inflation more quickly might be found 
through changes that reduced the time lags in the wage-price adjustment 
processes. 
George Perry and Arthur Okun thought that the purpose of the Gram- 
lich paper was not to determine empirically the optimal shape for a reces- 
sion to  curb inflation, but rather to  illustrate a  qualitative point.  One 
conclusion sometimes inferred from the nonlinearity of the Phillips curve 
is that unemployment should always be maintained at an average level. 
Gramlich demonstrates that since killing some inflation today also kills 
some inflation tomorrow, it pays to take more unemployment today and 
less tomorrow. 
Some confusion arose over the meaning of the estimates of the unem- 
ployment rates for 1976-80 that Gramlich used and that had appeared in 
the budget documents. Some read these as statements of the administra- 
tion's targets. But William Feliner stressed that the projections were not 
intended as forecasts or as recommendations. He insisted that, in explain- 
ing its economic assumptions, the administration  had stated explicitly that 
the projections were not  an administration goal,  since policy  decisions 
affecting  the time path would be made in response to economic conditions 
that cannot be forecast over so long a period. 